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Change in openvpn[master]: Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions

Openvpn-devel In review plaisthos (Code Review) 2 participants 11 messages Dec 20, 2024 – Jan 9, 2025 1 message not in the archive

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A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): gerrit.1734706182000.I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190@...2715...

#1 lore raw

Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld.

Hello flichtenheld,

I'd like you to do a code review.
Please visit

    http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843?usp=email

to review the following change.

Change subject: Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions
......................................................................

Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions

To avoid attacks (especially on Chacha20-Poly1305) we do not allow decryption anymore after 2**36 failed verifications.

Change-Id I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190

---
M src/openvpn/crypto.c
M src/openvpn/crypto.h
M src/openvpn/ssl.c

3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/43/843/1

src/openvpn/crypto.c +10 -1
index faf69fc..88a9f24 100644
@@ -405,7 +405,13 @@
 {
     static const char error_prefix[] = "AEAD Decrypt error";
     struct packet_id_net pin = { 0 };
-    const struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt;
+    struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt;
+
+    if (cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_exceeded(ctx))
+    {
+        CRYPT_DROP("Decryption failed verification limit reached.");
+    }
+
     int outlen;
     struct gc_arena gc;
 
@@ -416,6 +422,8 @@
     ASSERT(buf->len > 0);
     ASSERT(ctx->cipher);
 
+
+
     dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT FROM: %s",
          format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf), 80, &gc));
 
@@ -511,6 +519,7 @@
     if (!cipher_ctx_final_check_tag(ctx->cipher, BPTR(&work) + outlen,
                                     &outlen, tag_ptr, tag_size))
     {
+        ctx->failed_verifications++;
         CRYPT_DROP("packet tag authentication failed");
     }
     ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen));
src/openvpn/crypto.h +25 -0
index 4579b65..bb417e1 100644
@@ -181,6 +181,8 @@
      * with the current key in number of 128 bit blocks (only used for
      * AEAD ciphers) */
     uint64_t plaintext_blocks;
+    /** number of failed verification using this cipher */
+    uint64_t failed_verifications;
 };
 
 #define KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL 0 /* same keys for both directions */
@@ -623,6 +625,29 @@
 cipher_get_aead_limits(const char *ciphername);
 
 /**
+ * Check if the number of failed decryption is over the acceptable limit.
+ * We
+ */
+static inline bool
+cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_exceeded(const struct key_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    /* Use 2**36, same as TLS 1.3 */
+    return ctx->failed_verifications >  (1ull << 36);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if the number of failed decryption is approaching the limit and we
+ * should try to move to a new key
+ */
+static inline bool
+cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_warn(const struct key_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    /* Use 2**35, half the amount after which we refuse to decrypt */
+    return ctx->failed_verifications >  (1ull << 35);
+}
+
+
+/**
  * Blocksize used for the AEAD limit caluclation
  *
  * Since cipher_ctx_block_size() is not reliable and will return 1 in many
src/openvpn/ssl.c +5 -0
index c77c4ed..73201ef 100644
@@ -3042,6 +3042,11 @@
         return true;
     }
 
+    if (cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_warn(&key_ctx_bi->decrypt))
+    {
+        return true;
+    }
+
     return false;
 }
 /*

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Gerrit-Project: openvpn
Gerrit-Branch: master
Gerrit-Change-Id: I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190
Gerrit-Change-Number: 843
Gerrit-PatchSet: 1
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel <[email protected]>
Gerrit-Attention: flichtenheld <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-MessageType: newchange

#2 lore raw
In reply to a message not in the archive

Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld, plaisthos.

MaxF has posted comments on this change. ( http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843?usp=email )

Change subject: Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions
......................................................................

Patch Set 2: Code-Review-1

(5 comments)

Patchset:

PS2:
I'm unsure if we should use the 2^36 limit for Chacha-poly, but for AES-GCM it should be ok.

File src/openvpn/crypto.h:

http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843/comment/39d7c228_ac4d76f3 :
PS2, Line 667: We
Incomplete

http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843/comment/e2534d46_534f661c :
PS2, Line 672: TLS 1.3
Should be DTLS

http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843/comment/96fbdeb5_8ce34e21 :
PS2, Line 672: 2**36
I've been looking at the integrity bounds in the AEAD limits RFC again and I'm not sure if 2^36 is right for us. The number of decryption failures that we can tolerate depends on the maximum message length that we're willing to receive (L in the formulas).

The DTLS RFC assumes L <= 2^10, but for us it can be larger. I don't think this matters for AES-GCM, the 2^36 limit leaves lots of room to spare. But for Chacha-poly, it's pretty tight.

If we tolerate p = 2^-57 and we have L = 2^14, then we can only have 2^32 decryption failures.

File src/openvpn/crypto.c:

http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843/comment/62ea554d_ed6bec9a :
PS2, Line 426:
Extra whitespace

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Gerrit-Project: openvpn
Gerrit-Branch: master
Gerrit-Change-Id: I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190
Gerrit-Change-Number: 843
Gerrit-PatchSet: 2
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: MaxF <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <[email protected]...>
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Gerrit-Attention: plaisthos <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Attention: flichtenheld <[email protected]...>
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#3 lore raw
In reply to a message not in the archive

Attention is currently required from: MaxF, flichtenheld.

plaisthos has posted comments on this change. ( http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843?usp=email )

Change subject: Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions
......................................................................

Patch Set 2:

(1 comment)

File src/openvpn/crypto.h:

http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843/comment/8731b0c0_7b4731b8 :
PS2, Line 672: 2**36

Quoted 1 line

I've been looking at the integrity bounds in the AEAD limits RFC again and I'm not sure if 2^36 is r […]

IP and Ethernet packets greater than 2**10 * 16 = 16k are pretty rare. Should we design for 65k packets instead?

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Gerrit-Project: openvpn
Gerrit-Branch: master
Gerrit-Change-Id: I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190
Gerrit-Change-Number: 843
Gerrit-PatchSet: 2
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: MaxF <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel <[email protected]>
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#4 lore raw
In reply to a message not in the archive

Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld, plaisthos.

MaxF has posted comments on this change. ( http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843?usp=email )

Change subject: Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions
......................................................................

Patch Set 2:

(1 comment)

File src/openvpn/crypto.h:

http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843/comment/06c9974a_c8419cbb :
PS2, Line 672: 2**36

Quoted 1 line

IP and Ethernet packets greater than 2**10 * 16 = 16k are pretty rare. […]

I don't know. I thought you did consider larger packets in the OpenVPN RFC.

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Gerrit-Project: openvpn
Gerrit-Branch: master
Gerrit-Change-Id: I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190
Gerrit-Change-Number: 843
Gerrit-PatchSet: 2
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: MaxF <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <[email protected]...>
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#5 lore raw
In reply to a message not in the archive

Attention is currently required from: MaxF, flichtenheld.

plaisthos has posted comments on this change. ( http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843?usp=email )

Change subject: Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions
......................................................................

Patch Set 3:

(4 comments)

File src/openvpn/crypto.h:

http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843/comment/6408b1af_041def26 :
PS2, Line 667: We

Quoted 1 line

Incomplete

Acknowledged

http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843/comment/21fe7587_f0d0de4b :
PS2, Line 672: TLS 1.3

Quoted 1 line

Should be DTLS

Acknowledged

http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843/comment/a39b0e44_3b6d137a :
PS2, Line 672: 2**36

Quoted 1 line

I don't know. I thought you did consider larger packets in the OpenVPN RFC.

I commented that we accept this since chacha with > 16k is probably super rare.

File src/openvpn/crypto.c:

http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843/comment/33de160f_e3170849 :
PS2, Line 426:

Quoted 1 line

Extra whitespace

Acknowledged

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Gerrit-Project: openvpn
Gerrit-Branch: master
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Gerrit-Change-Number: 843
Gerrit-PatchSet: 3
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: MaxF <[email protected]...>
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#6 lore raw
In reply to a message not in the archive

Attention is currently required from: MaxF, flichtenheld.

Hello MaxF, flichtenheld,

I'd like you to reexamine a change. Please visit

    http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843?usp=email

to look at the new patch set (#4).

The following approvals got outdated and were removed:
Code-Review-1 by MaxF

Change subject: Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions
......................................................................

Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions

To avoid attacks (especially on Chacha20-Poly1305) we do not allow decryption anymore after 2**36 failed verifications.

Change-Id I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190

---
M src/openvpn/crypto.c
M src/openvpn/crypto.h
M src/openvpn/ssl.c

3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/43/843/4

src/openvpn/crypto.c +8 -1
index df38cdd..ee9b0c6 100644
@@ -405,7 +405,13 @@
 {
     static const char error_prefix[] = "AEAD Decrypt error";
     struct packet_id_net pin = { 0 };
-    const struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt;
+    struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt;
+
+    if (cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_exceeded(ctx))
+    {
+        CRYPT_DROP("Decryption failed verification limit reached.");
+    }
+
     int outlen;
     struct gc_arena gc;
 
@@ -511,6 +517,7 @@
     if (!cipher_ctx_final_check_tag(ctx->cipher, BPTR(&work) + outlen,
                                     &outlen, tag_ptr, tag_size))
     {
+        ctx->failed_verifications++;
         CRYPT_DROP("packet tag authentication failed");
     }
     ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen));
src/openvpn/crypto.h +28 -0
index 3ad31c5..fe81c7f 100644
@@ -209,6 +209,8 @@
      * with the current key in number of 128 bit blocks (only used for
      * AEAD ciphers) */
     uint64_t plaintext_blocks;
+    /** number of failed verification using this cipher */
+    uint64_t failed_verifications;
 };
 
 #define KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL 0 /* same keys for both directions */
@@ -661,6 +663,32 @@
 cipher_get_aead_limits(const char *ciphername);
 
 /**
+ * Check if the number of failed decryption is over the acceptable limit.
+ */
+static inline bool
+cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_exceeded(const struct key_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    /* Use 2**36, same as DTLS 1.3. Strictly speaking this only guarantees
+     * the security margin for packets up to 2^10 blocks (16384 bytes)
+     * but we accept slightly lower security bound for the edge
+     * of Chacha20-Poly1305 and packets over 16k as MTUs over 16k are
+     * extremely rarely used */
+    return ctx->failed_verifications >  (1ull << 36);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if the number of failed decryption is approaching the limit and we
+ * should try to move to a new key
+ */
+static inline bool
+cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_warn(const struct key_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    /* Use 2**35, half the amount after which we refuse to decrypt */
+    return ctx->failed_verifications >  (1ull << 35);
+}
+
+
+/**
  * Blocksize used for the AEAD limit caluclation
  *
  * Since cipher_ctx_block_size() is not reliable and will return 1 in many
src/openvpn/ssl.c +5 -0
index cf7f34f..e4a7b57 100644
@@ -3005,6 +3005,11 @@
         return true;
     }
 
+    if (cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_warn(&key_ctx_bi->decrypt))
+    {
+        return true;
+    }
+
     return false;
 }
 /*

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Gerrit-Project: openvpn
Gerrit-Branch: master
Gerrit-Change-Id: I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190
Gerrit-Change-Number: 843
Gerrit-PatchSet: 4
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: MaxF <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <[email protected]...>
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#7 lore raw
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Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld, plaisthos.

MaxF has posted comments on this change. ( http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843?usp=email )

Change subject: Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions
......................................................................

Patch Set 5: Code-Review+2

--
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Gerrit-Project: openvpn
Gerrit-Branch: master
Gerrit-Change-Id: I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190
Gerrit-Change-Number: 843
Gerrit-PatchSet: 5
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: MaxF <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel <[email protected]>
Gerrit-Attention: plaisthos <[email protected]...>
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#8 lore raw

PATCH v5 1/1 Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions

In reply to a message not in the archive

From: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>

To avoid attacks (especially on Chacha20-Poly1305) we do not allow decryption anymore after 2**36 failed verifications.

Change-Id I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190

---

This change was reviewed on Gerrit and approved by at least one developer. I request to merge it to master.

Gerrit URL: https://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843
This mail reflects revision 5 of this Change.

Acked-by according to Gerrit (reflected above):
MaxF <[email protected]...>

src/openvpn/crypto.c +8 -1
index df38cdd..ee9b0c6 100644
@@ -405,7 +405,13 @@
 {
     static const char error_prefix[] = "AEAD Decrypt error";
     struct packet_id_net pin = { 0 };
-    const struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt;
+    struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt;
+
+    if (cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_exceeded(ctx))
+    {
+        CRYPT_DROP("Decryption failed verification limit reached.");
+    }
+
     int outlen;
     struct gc_arena gc;
 
@@ -511,6 +517,7 @@
     if (!cipher_ctx_final_check_tag(ctx->cipher, BPTR(&work) + outlen,
                                     &outlen, tag_ptr, tag_size))
     {
+        ctx->failed_verifications++;
         CRYPT_DROP("packet tag authentication failed");
     }
     ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen));
src/openvpn/crypto.h +28 -0
index 3ad31c5..fe81c7f 100644
@@ -209,6 +209,8 @@
      * with the current key in number of 128 bit blocks (only used for
      * AEAD ciphers) */
     uint64_t plaintext_blocks;
+    /** number of failed verification using this cipher */
+    uint64_t failed_verifications;
 };
 
 #define KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL 0 /* same keys for both directions */
@@ -661,6 +663,32 @@
 cipher_get_aead_limits(const char *ciphername);
 
 /**
+ * Check if the number of failed decryption is over the acceptable limit.
+ */
+static inline bool
+cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_exceeded(const struct key_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    /* Use 2**36, same as DTLS 1.3. Strictly speaking this only guarantees
+     * the security margin for packets up to 2^10 blocks (16384 bytes)
+     * but we accept slightly lower security bound for the edge
+     * of Chacha20-Poly1305 and packets over 16k as MTUs over 16k are
+     * extremely rarely used */
+    return ctx->failed_verifications >  (1ull << 36);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if the number of failed decryption is approaching the limit and we
+ * should try to move to a new key
+ */
+static inline bool
+cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_warn(const struct key_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    /* Use 2**35, half the amount after which we refuse to decrypt */
+    return ctx->failed_verifications >  (1ull << 35);
+}
+
+
+/**
  * Blocksize used for the AEAD limit caluclation
  *
  * Since cipher_ctx_block_size() is not reliable and will return 1 in many
src/openvpn/ssl.c +5 -0
index cf7f34f..e4a7b57 100644
@@ -3005,6 +3005,11 @@
         return true;
     }
 
+    if (cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_warn(&key_ctx_bi->decrypt))
+    {
+        return true;
+    }
+
     return false;
 }
 /*
#9 lore raw

[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions

I have not actually tested this (hard to get 2^35 correctly-bad packets out into reasonable time...) but stared at the code, and ran the full client/server test suite "just to be sure". MaxF understands crypto and has ACKed it in Gerrit.

As discussed on IRC, I have added a few references to the commit message so people with a less deep crypto background can inform themselves what this is all about.

Your patch has been applied to the master branch.

commit ffe0ad41985d7d5f67ae6fc7d58ffa327243f76b

Author: Arne Schwabe
Date:   Thu Jan 9 18:49:28 2025 +0100
     Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions

     Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
     Acked-by: MaxF <[email protected]...>
     Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
     URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg30387.html
     Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>

--
kind regards,

Gert Doering

#10 lore raw
In reply to a message not in the archive

cron2 has uploaded a new patch set (#6) to the change originally created by plaisthos. ( http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843?usp=email )

The following approvals got outdated and were removed:
Code-Review+2 by MaxF

Change subject: Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions
......................................................................

Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions

To avoid attacks (especially on Chacha20-Poly1305) we do not allow decryption anymore after 2**36 failed verifications.

After 2**35, we trigger a renegotiation (to avoid that situation).

For the theoretical background, see

- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-limits/
- RFC 9147 (DTLS 1.3) section 4.5.3 "AEAD limits"
- https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/051.pdf

Change-Id I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190

Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg30387.html

---
M src/openvpn/crypto.c
M src/openvpn/crypto.h
M src/openvpn/ssl.c

3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/43/843/6

src/openvpn/crypto.c +8 -1
index df38cdd..ee9b0c6 100644
@@ -405,7 +405,13 @@
 {
     static const char error_prefix[] = "AEAD Decrypt error";
     struct packet_id_net pin = { 0 };
-    const struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt;
+    struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt;
+
+    if (cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_exceeded(ctx))
+    {
+        CRYPT_DROP("Decryption failed verification limit reached.");
+    }
+
     int outlen;
     struct gc_arena gc;
 
@@ -511,6 +517,7 @@
     if (!cipher_ctx_final_check_tag(ctx->cipher, BPTR(&work) + outlen,
                                     &outlen, tag_ptr, tag_size))
     {
+        ctx->failed_verifications++;
         CRYPT_DROP("packet tag authentication failed");
     }
     ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen));
src/openvpn/crypto.h +28 -0
index 3ad31c5..fe81c7f 100644
@@ -209,6 +209,8 @@
      * with the current key in number of 128 bit blocks (only used for
      * AEAD ciphers) */
     uint64_t plaintext_blocks;
+    /** number of failed verification using this cipher */
+    uint64_t failed_verifications;
 };
 
 #define KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL 0 /* same keys for both directions */
@@ -661,6 +663,32 @@
 cipher_get_aead_limits(const char *ciphername);
 
 /**
+ * Check if the number of failed decryption is over the acceptable limit.
+ */
+static inline bool
+cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_exceeded(const struct key_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    /* Use 2**36, same as DTLS 1.3. Strictly speaking this only guarantees
+     * the security margin for packets up to 2^10 blocks (16384 bytes)
+     * but we accept slightly lower security bound for the edge
+     * of Chacha20-Poly1305 and packets over 16k as MTUs over 16k are
+     * extremely rarely used */
+    return ctx->failed_verifications >  (1ull << 36);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if the number of failed decryption is approaching the limit and we
+ * should try to move to a new key
+ */
+static inline bool
+cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_warn(const struct key_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    /* Use 2**35, half the amount after which we refuse to decrypt */
+    return ctx->failed_verifications >  (1ull << 35);
+}
+
+
+/**
  * Blocksize used for the AEAD limit caluclation
  *
  * Since cipher_ctx_block_size() is not reliable and will return 1 in many
src/openvpn/ssl.c +5 -0
index cf7f34f..e4a7b57 100644
@@ -3005,6 +3005,11 @@
         return true;
     }
 
+    if (cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_warn(&key_ctx_bi->decrypt))
+    {
+        return true;
+    }
+
     return false;
 }
 /*

--
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Gerrit-Project: openvpn
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Gerrit-Change-Id: I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190
Gerrit-Change-Number: 843
Gerrit-PatchSet: 6
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#11 lore raw
In reply to a message not in the archive

cron2 has submitted this change. ( http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843?usp=email )

Change subject: Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions
......................................................................

Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions

To avoid attacks (especially on Chacha20-Poly1305) we do not allow decryption anymore after 2**36 failed verifications.

After 2**35, we trigger a renegotiation (to avoid that situation).

For the theoretical background, see

- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-limits/
- RFC 9147 (DTLS 1.3) section 4.5.3 "AEAD limits"
- https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/051.pdf

Change-Id I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190

Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg30387.html

---
M src/openvpn/crypto.c
M src/openvpn/crypto.h
M src/openvpn/ssl.c

3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/openvpn/crypto.c +8 -1
index df38cdd..ee9b0c6 100644
@@ -405,7 +405,13 @@
 {
     static const char error_prefix[] = "AEAD Decrypt error";
     struct packet_id_net pin = { 0 };
-    const struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt;
+    struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt;
+
+    if (cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_exceeded(ctx))
+    {
+        CRYPT_DROP("Decryption failed verification limit reached.");
+    }
+
     int outlen;
     struct gc_arena gc;
 
@@ -511,6 +517,7 @@
     if (!cipher_ctx_final_check_tag(ctx->cipher, BPTR(&work) + outlen,
                                     &outlen, tag_ptr, tag_size))
     {
+        ctx->failed_verifications++;
         CRYPT_DROP("packet tag authentication failed");
     }
     ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen));
src/openvpn/crypto.h +28 -0
index 3ad31c5..fe81c7f 100644
@@ -209,6 +209,8 @@
      * with the current key in number of 128 bit blocks (only used for
      * AEAD ciphers) */
     uint64_t plaintext_blocks;
+    /** number of failed verification using this cipher */
+    uint64_t failed_verifications;
 };
 
 #define KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL 0 /* same keys for both directions */
@@ -661,6 +663,32 @@
 cipher_get_aead_limits(const char *ciphername);
 
 /**
+ * Check if the number of failed decryption is over the acceptable limit.
+ */
+static inline bool
+cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_exceeded(const struct key_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    /* Use 2**36, same as DTLS 1.3. Strictly speaking this only guarantees
+     * the security margin for packets up to 2^10 blocks (16384 bytes)
+     * but we accept slightly lower security bound for the edge
+     * of Chacha20-Poly1305 and packets over 16k as MTUs over 16k are
+     * extremely rarely used */
+    return ctx->failed_verifications >  (1ull << 36);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if the number of failed decryption is approaching the limit and we
+ * should try to move to a new key
+ */
+static inline bool
+cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_warn(const struct key_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    /* Use 2**35, half the amount after which we refuse to decrypt */
+    return ctx->failed_verifications >  (1ull << 35);
+}
+
+
+/**
  * Blocksize used for the AEAD limit caluclation
  *
  * Since cipher_ctx_block_size() is not reliable and will return 1 in many
src/openvpn/ssl.c +5 -0
index cf7f34f..e4a7b57 100644
@@ -3005,6 +3005,11 @@
         return true;
     }
 
+    if (cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_warn(&key_ctx_bi->decrypt))
+    {
+        return true;
+    }
+
     return false;
 }
 /*

--
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Gerrit-Project: openvpn
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Gerrit-Change-Id: I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190
Gerrit-Change-Number: 843
Gerrit-PatchSet: 6
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: MaxF <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <[email protected]...>
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Gerrit-MessageType: merged